World War II - 1/20/10 Revision

World War II is one of those topics that comes up over and over again when guys (and sometimes women too) start chatting. Even more often it comes up in online forums. This is the space dedicated to storing information and arguments about the topic e.g. contemporary quotes from both sides that claim strategic bombing is useless.

Finally, it is important to remember that no war has ever been brought to an end simply by indiscriminate bombing and mass killing of civilians. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that such strategies typically strengthened resistance.

http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/650

Another vital lesson - one that has taken even air specialists by surprise - relates to the behaviour of civilian populations under air punishment. It had generally been assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reactions. ... The progress of this war has tended to indicate that this expectation was unfounded. ... These facts are significant beyond their psychological interest. They mean that haphazard destruction of cities - sheer blows at morale - are costly and wasteful in relation to the tactical results achieved. Attacks will increasingly be concentrated on military rather than on random human targets. Unplanned vandalism from the air must give way, more and more, to planned, predetermined destruction. More than ever the principal objectives will be critical aggregates of electric power, aviation industries, dock facilities, essential public utilities and the like." -- Major Alexander Seversky, US Army Air Force, Victory Through Air Power (NY, 1942).


After the war, the German Minister for Armaments Production, Albert Speer, professed shock that "vast but pointless area bombing" was being continued in favor of highly effective precision bombing.[10] According to Speer, the failure to continue regularly attacking Schweinfurt allowed the Reich to escape a "further catastrophic blow" because "armaments production would have been crucially weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill."[11] "What really saved us," Speer continued, "was the fact that from this time on the enemy to our astonishment once again ceased his attacks on the ball-bearing industry."

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/war.crimes/World.war.2/Bombing.htm#AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO AREA BOMBING


In the case of the air war against the Third Reich, bombing only caused serious economic disruptions in the final year of the war, roughly from June 1944 to May 1945. By this time a German military defeat was pretty much a foregone conclusion. Based on such results, it is impossible to demonstrate that the bombing campaign would have achieved an economic breakdown of Germany since by the time such destruction was being caused, the fronts were already collapsing in both east and west. The Soviet Union, for all intents, had won the land war by the middle of 1944 and the successful Normandy invasion delivered the coup de grace. To make a case for the bombing campaign being decisive the reverse would have to be expected. That is, the fronts would have had to collapse after the industrial damage was done.

http://www.onwar.com/articles/9809.htm


J K Galbraith, "The Affluent Society", chapter 12. Book first published 1958.

A summary of the relevant part:

Because Galbraith was part of the strategic air command and was involved in the bombing of cities in WWII, he was intimately familiar with the consequences of that campaign, and he tells a story about how production actually increased after the bombing because all the people engaged in services, like waiters and housecleaners and barbers, went into production after the city had been destroyed.

http://www.amazon.com/review/R30M5KK6QY33DG

See also

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS-PTO-Summary.html


In the days immediately following the surrender of Germany, the Allies
interrogated numerous high-ranking Germans. All were asked what chief
factor led to their country's defeat. Here is a sampling and summary of
what they said:

Hjalmar Schacht, Finance Minister:
"Your bombers destroyed German production."

Adolf Galland:
"Allied bombing of our oil industries had the greatest effect."

Gen. Jahn, Commander in Lombardy:
"The attacks on the German transportation system."

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, Inspector General of armored units:
"Lack of German air superiority; the German Air Force was unable to cope
with Allied air power in the West."

Generalmajor Albrect von Massow, Luftwaffe Training Commander:
"The attacks on German oil production."

Generalmajor Herhudt von Rohden, chief of historical section, Luftwaffe
General Staff:
"Strategic bombing. It was the decisive factor in the long run."

Generalmajor Kolb, in charge of technical training, Air Ministry: "The
power of Allied day and night bombing."

General Ingenieur Spies, chief engineer of Luftflotte 10: "Strategic
disruption of communications."

Generaloberst Georg Lindemann, commander of troops in Denmark:
"Allied air superiority."

Gen. Feldmarschall Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, commander in chief in the
West:
"Three factors: the superiority of your air force, which made all
movement in daylight impossible; lack of motor fuel so that panzers were
unable to move; and the systematic destruction of all railway
communications so that it was impossible to bring even one single railroad
train across the Rhine."

Gen. der Infanterie Georg Thomas, chief of the German Office of
Production:
"Without strategic bombing, the war would have lasted years longer."

Fritz Thyssen, leading German steel producer:
"I knew that German steel production would be bombed and destroyed--as it
was."

Gen. der Flieger Hans-Georg von Seidel, C in C, Luftflotte 10:
"The decisive factor was disruption of German transport communications."

Gen. Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring, C in C in the West after von R.:
"Dive bombing and terror attacks on civilians proved our undoing."

Generaleutnant Karl Jacob Veith, in charge of flak training:
"The destruction of the oil industry."

Generalmajor Ibel, commander of 2 Fighter Div.:
"Allied air superiority allowed everything else to happen."

General Wolff, SS Obergruppenfuehrer:
"The ever-increasing disruption of production and transportation
facilities starved the frontlines to death."

Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, supreme commander SW Italy: "Allied air
attacks on the aircraft and fuel industries."

Oscar Henschel, industrialist:
"American bombing caused our production figures to drop considerably."

Unnamed director of Germany's steel combine:
"The virtual flattening of the great steel city of Dusseldorf contributed
at least 50 percent to the collapse of the war effort."

Feldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim, Goering's successor: "The
destruction of the Luftwaffe."

Unnamed general manager of Junkers:
"The attacks on the ball-bearing industry disorganized Germany's entire
war production."

General Feldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, C in C Luftflotte 3:
"Allied bombing, particularly of communications."

Unnamed executive at Siemens-Schuckert:
"In March, 1943, one bomb ignited the oil tanks in our transformer plant,
which we believe is the largest in the world, and completely stopped
production of the large type of transformers needed for chemcial and steel
plants. We were the sole manufacturer of such machines. We were never
able to make them again."

Gen. der Flieger Karl Bodenschatz, chief of Ministeramt, Luftwaffe high
command:
"I am very much impressed with the accuracy of American daylight bombing,
which really concentrated on military targets, stations and factories, to
the exclusion of civilian targets."

Christian Schneider, manager of the Leuna Works, producer of synthetic
petroleum products:
"The 8th AF twice knocked out the plant and the RAF did once. Production,
once resumed, was a pitifully thin trickle."

Alfred Krupp, weapons maker:
"The Allies made a great mistake in failing to bomb rail lines and canals
much earlier. Transport was the great bottleneck in production. Plants
can be and were dispersed, but the Reichsbahn couldn't put its lines
underground."

General Dollman, diarist of the 7th Army high command:
"The continual control of the field of battle by Allied air forces makes
daylight movement impossible and leads to the destruction from air of our
preparations and attacks."

Herman Goering: "[USAAF] precision bombing had a greater effect on the
defeat of Germany than [RAF] area bombing because destroyed cities could
be evacuated but destroyed industry was difficult to replace. [8th AF]
selection of targets was good. Without the U.S. [Army] Air Force, the
war would still be going on."


Knoke was leading a group of Me 109s on 14 May 1943:
"The enemy raids Kiel.... Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own
guns. The shooting by the Navy is unfortunately so good that we are
considerably disorganized.
"I observe the Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the Germania
shipyards. I am impressed by the precision with which those bastards
bomb: it is fantastic."

From Hienz Knoke's "I Flew for the Fuhrer."

http://yarchive.net/mil/strategic_bombing.html